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Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in ‘The mis-understandings of the Self-Understand-
ing View’ (2013) has some merits, but neither is 
moved to change their position and accept that the 
Psychological View has more going for it (and the 
Self-Understanding View less) than Schechtman 
originally contended. Schechtman thinks her case 
could be better expressed, and then the deficiencies 
of the Psychological View will be manifest. That 
view is committed to Locke’s insight about the 
importance of phenomenological connections to 
identity, but cannot do justice to this insight and 
as a result fails to explain things that it should. I 
will argue that my case still applies, re-expression 
notwithstanding, and that the Psychological View 
is much better off as an account of identity than 
either respondent acknowledges.
The Psychological View does not capture what 
Schechtman presents as Locke’s insight. Phenom-
enological connections only feature now and 
then in its account of the self and, although they 
are seen as important connections, they are not 
fundamental to the account. Phenomenological 
connections are one sort of psychological connec-
tion among the many that constitute the continuity 
that features in this account. The account allows, 
as she pointed out in 2005, even whole life phases 
that count as ours but to which we have no con-
scious access.
I maintain that the Psychological View has got 
this right. Much of our psychological life, relevant 
to our personhood, goes on without our aware-
ness. Locke agrees: he imagines a “Spirit wholly 
stripp’d of all its memory or consciousness of 
past Actions, as we find our Minds are of a great 
part of ours, and sometimes of them all” (Locke 
1975, 346 [my italics]). This is true of unconscious 
states like repressed ones, which may strongly af-
fect behavior, and also true of everyday states like 
intentions: once an intention is formed, it will be 
most effective if we manage to get it out of our 
consciousness—thinking about it may well lead 
to wavering and giving in to temptation (Holton 
2009, 98–9). In her reply, Schechtman concedes 
that the Psychological View copes well with un-
conscious states, something she seemed to deny 
originally. Her clarified position is that it cannot 
cope with them and capture Locke’s insight. But 
my point is that it only copes so well because it 
gives a lesser role to phenomenological connec-
tions: the narrative attempt to include them as 
fundamental alongside unconscious states is one 
of the places where narrative views unravel.
Schechtman presents the attractiveness of the 
Self-Understanding View as being its placement of 
phenomenological connections as central to iden-
tity (with the advantages this brings in explaining 
self-concern and moral responsibility) while also 
coping with unconscious states. My contention 
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(which was not as clear as it might have been) 
was that in doing one of those, it loses the ability 
to do the other satisfactorily.
In its account of identity, self-concern, and per-
sonal moral responsibility, the phenomenological 
aspect is foregrounded. It is because we can make 
sense of actions and states as ours that they are 
ours and that we are responsible for them. How-
ever, this leaves out many unconscious states and 
activities which are ours. It certainly leaves out 
repressed states and the real reasons behind many 
actions—such as in the case of the shoppers that 
I raised. The states that the shoppers can make 
sense of as theirs are not the ones behind their 
choices—they are not the causes of their behavior. 
Schechtman’s Self-Understanding View included 
unconscious states in the picture by appealing 
to the need that others have in making sense of 
a person’s life (Schechtman 2005, 20). Now she 
puts it as such states being “in a position to trouble 
self-interpretation, and so to disturb the experience 
of unity” (Schechtman 2013, 49). But neither of 
these attempts manages to include the empathic 
access to states and experiences that performed the 
function of explaining them as ours and made us 
responsible ‘to and for’ them. Moreover, the re-
pressed person—like the shoppers—may well have 
no disturbance in their experience of unity. Their 
sense of self is intact, but it is a misrepresentation 
of what is going on. Narrative is crucial in our 
formation of a sense of self, but our sense of self 
is often a poor guide to ourselves.
There are countless everyday instances of 
this—like the shoppers—but pathological cases 
make the gap graphic. Sufferers from thought-
insertion experience the thoughts of others oc-
curring in their minds. They are certain these are 
not their thoughts and the thoughts have no place 
in their sense of self (Mullins and Spence 2003). 
But they are their thoughts, and are certainly not 
the thoughts of those the sufferers ascribe them 
to. All of this gives us strong reason to question 
Schechtman’s suggestion that “identity involves 
the continuation of . . . self-experience” (Schecht-
man 2013, 49).
Thus, my charge is that the narrative or Self-
Understanding View can include phenomeno-
logical connections, but at the cost of a coherent 
account of unconscious states. If it includes the 
latter, it loses its distinctive explanation of what 
makes actions and states ours and what makes us 
responsible for them.
The Psychological View has no similar di-
lemma. As Schechtman now acknowledges, it 
includes unconscious states unproblematically 
because it does not require phenomenological con-
nections in its account of what makes states ours. 
Schechtman suggests that my defence of the view 
faces a different problem here, however, in that 
the Psychological View is committed to Locke’s 
insight and so obliged to require phenomenologi-
cal connections in its account. My response would 
thus be in conflict with other commitments of 
the view. But I think this is not true—neither the 
Psychological View nor Locke have the commit-
ments she envisages.
Her suggestion is that the commitment springs 
from the reliance of the Psychological View on the 
sort of thought experiments that Locke used to 
ground his position. The idea is presumably that 
(first) body-swap thought experiments like Locke’s 
prince and cobbler case work only because of the 
resonance of certain phenomenological features of 
the characters in the story, and (second) that the 
Psychological View requires these thought experi-
ments to establish itself over competing views—
Olson’s animalism is the one she mentions. But the 
first claim does not commit the Psychological theo-
rist to the necessity of phenomenological connec-
tions and the second claim seems to me to be false. 
In the case of second claim, although Psychological 
theorists often do use thought experiments, they 
are by no means universally favored—Nicholas 
Agar (2003), for example, presents a case for the 
view that sets out to avoid them; and although they 
may be a useful heuristic tool, they are not crucial 
in making the case against animalism. The appeal 
of the Psychological View over animalism issues 
from a widespread understanding that persons 
are fundamentally agents—that is, psychological 
things. On Olson’s animalist account, they are 
not; but then it seems that we are talking about 
different things and that his theory is not about 
persons in our sense at all. This intuition that 
persons are fundamentally agents is one (as I made 
clear) that is shared with narrative theorists. You 
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can reinforce it with a thought experiment if you 
want to, but there is no need for that.
Even if thought experiments were the favored 
method of supporting the Psychological View, and 
even if they did rely on phenomenological connec-
tions, this would not commit the view to those 
connections being necessary for identity. Thought 
experiments like the prince and the cobbler help 
to show that being the same animal is not neces-
sary for personal identity. They do not establish 
any particular psychological feature as necessary. 
Locke presents the story as showing that having 
the same body is not required for being the same 
person—at most it is required for being the ‘same 
Man’: “And thus we may be able without any dif-
ficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resur-
rection, though in a Body not exactly in make or 
parts the same which he had here” (Locke 1975, 
340). The story (like any experiment) can only 
hope to establish what is not always or necessar-
ily the case: it cannot establish what is necessary.
Furthermore, Locke seems to agree with the 
Psychological View that phenomenological con-
nections are not necessary for identity (not even 
for being ‘the same consciousness’), as Shelley 
Weinberg (2011) has argued. Locke is at pains to 
have his view be consistent with divine rectification 
as the reference to the resurrection reminds us. He 
realizes that someone on the day of judgment may 
not have any phenomenological connection to 
themselves when they performed some past action 
for which they should be punished or rewarded (he 
talks of “the forgetfulness Men have of their past 
Actions,” 1975, 344). God could restore that con-
nection on the day, thus making the person aware 
that their punishment was just, but then God 
would be using an account of personal identity 
that does not depend on phenomenological con-
nections (although His theory of just punishment 
might well involve them). There is then something 
else to Locke’s notion of ‘the same consciousness’ 
than phenomenological connectedness—the per-
son who on the day of judgment has forgotten 
their action is the person who committed it: they 
are in possession of the same consciousness, de-
spite the missing phenomenological connection.
I have argued (in opposition to Schechtman’s 
contentions) that the Psychological View is not 
committed to including phenomenological con-
nections as fundamental to identity and that there 
are good reasons for not requiring them. But are 
there not some costs as well? Schechtman suggests 
that by offering only ‘likeness or continuity in the 
contents of consciousness,’ the Psychological View 
is unable to explain why the special concern we 
feel for our own future states is rationally required 
or to explain our moral responsibility ‘to and for’ 
past states and actions. This is what Parfit (who 
I cited as presenting the archetype Psychological 
View) calls the ‘Extreme Claim’—a claim that she 
says he embraces.
All of those suggestions go too far. Parfit hardly 
embraces the Extreme Claim. He acknowledges 
it is defensible (Parfit 1984, 310–1). But he also 
insists that its denial, a Moderate Claim—that 
the continuity envisaged by the Psychological 
View does provide reason for special concern and 
explanation of responsibility—is just as defensible 
(1984, 312). And indeed it is—or, at least, it is 
plausible that the Psychological View explains all 
that it can be expected to explain.
Schechtman’s reasoning as to why what the 
Psychological View offers is inadequate recalls the 
case she offered in her The Constitution of Selves 
(1996). Back then she wrote, “Self-interested 
concern is an emotion that is appropriately felt 
only toward my own self and not toward someone 
like me” (1996, 52) and “It doesn’t matter if the 
person who gets my paycheck is more like me than 
someone else; I am only compensated if I get the 
money” (1996, 52–3). This is clearly unfair as a 
criticism of the Psychological View. That view does 
not just require mere similarity in the content of 
mental states, but that the later states be similar 
because of the earlier states. My future self will 
have specific mental states because of the ones I 
have now—just as I am the kind of person I am 
now because of earlier experiences and influences. 
This is relevant to issues like desert, responsibility, 
and self-concern. It does not matter that someone 
like me gets paid for what I did because their 
current states do not have the right relation to 
experiences of mine: they do not feel the aches I 
feel as a result of the effort I put in to earn that 
paycheck. If they did feel those aches because of 
that effort and I did not, then it becomes much less 
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clear that they do not deserve the compensation.
More generally, psychological continuity in-
volves much more than just a chain of similar 
states. Believing that I am in pain comes with a 
memory of what the pain originally felt like, of 
what I was doing at the time and with a range of 
other memories, beliefs, desires and other states: it 
is part of a complex psychological pattern. Psycho-
logical continuity involves an extremely complex 
pattern of these complex patterns. So Schecht-
man is correct that I am picturing ‘psychological 
causation of a functionalist stripe,’ but this is not 
just functionalist dogma—it is precisely what is 
involved in being a continuing psychological thing. 
And with these complex patterns in place, self-
interested concern and matters of responsibility do 
anything but fall out of the picture. Self-interested 
concern may not be rationally required of the self 
of the psychological view, but it certainly can be 
explained and justified why you have a special 
concern for your own future self that you do not 
have for others. And although the Psychological 
View may not have an explanation of why you 
are morally responsible for all and only your ac-
tions, the complex causal links between you now 
and the self who performed the action go a long 
way to doing that, bearing also in mind my earlier 
contention that this moral principle is by no means 
as universal as Schechtman has claimed.
Gillett begins his response to my paper by out-
lining ‘another way of seeing things’ (Gillett 2013, 
43). My original arguments were not aimed at any 
view other than a narrative or a Psychological 
View, so insofar as this is ‘another way’ it would 
not be affected by what I had to say. Nevertheless, 
he does make suggestions as to where aspects of 
his view coincide with a narrative view and may 
raise problems for my account. I focus on those.
First, however, I want to deny one thrust of 
his response. He characterizes my case against 
Schechtman’s view as falling into the camp of crit-
ics of narrative theories who argue that “narrative 
theories do not add anything to the more down-
to-earth (potentially reductive) functional story” 
(Gillett 2013, 45). What I argued was not this. I 
held that Schechtman’s view had certain internal 
problems and was unable to cope adequately with 
unconscious states and argued that the Psychologi-
cal View was not plagued with these problems. 
Schechtman charges that the Psychological View 
will get ascriptions of states wrong—ascribing 
states to the wrong person and not ascribing others 
to the person to whom they belong. I contended 
that in most cases (other than those of unconscious 
states, which the Self-Understanding View has 
trouble ascribing correctly) the two theories will 
ascribe the same states to the same persons. That 
is not saying that narrative adds nothing. I accept 
that narrative plays an important role in our sense 
of self and perhaps in an account of autonomy, 
but that is not where the issue between the two 
theories lies.
The problems Gillett raises for my account 
relate to the supposed core of that account in 
functionalism. A central charge is that my “causal 
view assumes that the link between thoughts and 
behavior is causal but that thesis is highly suspect” 
(Gillett 2013, 44). Reasons, he responds, cannot 
be brute causal features of nature but rather work 
through you adjusting “your behavior to the hu-
man life-world, mutually fashioned out of meaning 
and contingency, and to shape what you do in a 
way that evinces a kind of integrity characteristic 
of the life story you are living” (Gillett 2013, 44).
I am not particularly sympathetic to this ac-
count of reasons, but that aside, I think this re-
sponse misses the mark. The Psychological View 
is not an account of agency, although it does cast 
persons as agents. Even though it features causal 
connections, it is not tied to a causal theory of 
action (as I pointed out in the original article, I 
was using a deliberately thin notion of reasons 
for action). The causal connections that are its 
focus are between mental states, some of which 
will influence behavior—how that works is not 
specified by the theory. It is quite compatible with 
you shaping what you do in the fashion Gillett 
outlines. The only occasions where I insisted on a 
causal relation between mental states and behavior 
were in the cases of unconscious and unreasoned 
behavior like that of the shoppers. I think it is 
misleading to insist, as Gillett does, that causality 
has to be ‘brute’; but, even so, these cases strike me 
as involving some sort of ‘brute forces of nature.’ 
When it comes to such cases, the narrative that is 
offered is very often simply wrong: the behavior 
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has nothing to do with the life story you think 
you are living. And yet it is your behavior and the 
psychology behind it is yours.
The upshot is that I think that the consider-
ations that Gillett and Schechtman offer do not 
undermine the defence I put forward of the Psy-
chological View against Schechtman’s criticisms of 
it. In the disagreement between it and the Self-Un-
derstanding View, it comes out remarkably well.
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